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Vermont Civil Unions, Full Faith
and Credit, and Marital Status
BY LEWIS A. SILVERMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
n the past decade, the highest courts of two states issued rulings
challenging the prohibition ofsame-seximarriage. In both states, the
issue was remanded. In Hawaii, an intervening state constitutional
amendment mooted the law suit;1 in Vermont, the Legislature was directed
to grant appropriate relief.2 Vermont, in its exercise of judicial and
legislative functions, has created a new quasi-marital animal: the civil
union.3 This appears to satisfy the judicial mandate to provide the benefits
"Assistant Professor of Clinical Law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law
Center. J.D. 1976, Boston University; B.A. 1973, New York University. The
author wishes to thank research assistants Valerie Zuckerman and Doreen Cordova
for their help.
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), remanded sub nom. Baehr v.
Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996), rev'd, 994 P.2d
566 (Haw. 1999) (unpublished table decision). Although the initial decision found
an equal protection violation under the Hawaii Constitution, a subsequent
amendment allowing the Legislature to reserve marriage for opposite-sex couples
rendered the case moot, and the Hawaii Supreme Court dismissed it on that ground,
carefully declining to vacate its initial ruling. Id
2Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 886-89 (Vt. 1999).
3An Act Relating to Civil Unions, 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91.
While a system of civil unions does not bestow the status of civil marriage,
it does satisfy the requirements of the Common Benefits Clause. Changes
in the way significant legal relationships are established under the
constitution should be approached carefully, combining respect for the
community and cultural institutions most affected with a commitment to the
constitutionalrights involved. Grantingbenefits andprotections to same-sex
couples through a system of civil unions will provide due respect for
tradition and long-standing social institutions, and will permit adjustment
as unanticipated consequences or unmet needs arise.
Id. § 1(10).
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of marriage to same-sex partners, yet their union is specifically not labeled
a "marriage. '4
In response to Hawaii's initial case, many states enacted statutes
defining marriage as specifically between a male and a female, thereby
indicating that they would not grant full faith and credit under the United
States Constitution to any same-sex marriage contracted elsewhere.' The
United States Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act,6 which
sought to interpret the Full Faith and Credit Clause in the same manner.
Now Vermont has enacted its Civil Union Law7 that, while not technically
allowing same-sex marriage, creates a new and unique institution. This
institution is, in effect, a quasi-marriage. Further, the Civil Union Law
restricts participation in a civil union to people who are not otherwise
married;' it also prohibits partners who are engaged in a legal civil union
from marrying anyone else or engaging in any other civil union.9
This Article discusses whether the Vermont Civil Union is equivalent
to a legal marriage for the purposes of determining someone's marital
I "Civil marriage under Vermont's marriage statutes consists of a union
between a man and a woman. This interpretation of the state's marriage laws was
upheld by the Supreme Court in Baker v. State." Id. § 1(1) (citing Baker v.
Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999)).
s Driven by the fear that Hawaii courts may soon legitimize same-sex
marriages, legislators in more than 30 states and in Congress have
introduced legislation to ensure the states will not have to recognize such
unions.
.... At the state level, at least 10 bills prohibiting recognition of gay
marriages already have been adopted.
Henry J. Reske, A Matter of Full Faith: Legislators Scramble to Bar Recognition
of Gay Marriages, 82 A.B.A.J. 32 (1996).
6 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419
(1996) (codified at I U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. V 1999) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. IV
1998)).
2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91.
For a civil union to be established in Vermont, it shall be necessary that
the parties to a civil union satisfy all of the following criteria:
(1) Not be a party to another civil union or marriage.
(2) Be of the same sex and therefore excluded from the marriage laws
of this state.
(3) Meet the criteria and obligations set forth in 18 V.S.A. chapter
106.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1202 (Supp. 2000).
9 "Marriages contracted while either party has a living spouse or a living party
to a civil union shall be void." 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91, § 24.
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status. More specifically, will a participant in a Vermont civil union be
prohibited from entering into a legal marriage in another state? Will there
also be an effect, such as reciprocity or any form of comity,' ° granted to a
civil union by a state or municipalitythat extends domestic partner benefits
to its same-sex couples," especially in the establishment or termination of
local domestic partnerships? Ultimately, we must consider whether present
constitutionaljurisprudence requires states other than Vermont to grant full
faith and credit, 2 not to the civil union per se, but to its declaration of
marital status, which denies the right of marriage to either of the partners
in any other jurisdiction.
Part II of this Article presents two hypothetical situations to consider
during the rest of this discussion. 3 Part rI4 will discuss the case of Baker
v. Vermont 5 and the Vermont Civil Union Law."6 PartIV discusses the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution and the jurispru-
dence under that clause. 17 This section also analyzes marital status as
previously determined by individual states pursuant to the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, with special attention on Williams v. North Carolina"8 and
its progeny. Included in this discussion is a review of the Defense of
Marriage Act 9 and whether it has any application in this area. Part V
analyzes the law in this area and draws together the previous discussion in
10 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990) defines 'judicial comity" as
"[t]he principle in accordance with which the courts of one state orjurisdiction will
give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another, not as a matter of
obligation, but out of deference and respect." Id
" In the past two decades domestic partnership benefits have been granted by
the State of Hawaii and by dozens of municipalities throughout the United States.
See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C (Supp. 1999); S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 62
(1991); see also Raymond C. O'Brien, Domestic Partnership: Recognition and
Responsibility, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 163 (1995).
12 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 'Tull Faith and Credit shall be given in each State
to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." Id
'3See infranotes 21-22 and accompanying text.
'4See infra notes 23-41 and accompanying text.
"Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
'6An Act Relating to Civil Unions, 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91.
17 See infra notes 42-140 and accompanying text.
"Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419
(1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. V 1999) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. IV
1998)).
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specific relation to the Vermont Civil Union.2° The analysis suggests the
conclusion that, whether or not states decline to extend full faith and credit
to a marriage between a same-sex couple that is contracted in another state,
sister states will, nevertheless, be required to accept the determination of
marital status pursuant to Vermont's Civil Union Law.
II.
A. Hypothetical No. 1
Will Truman and Jack McFarland21 are residents of New York City.
Will is employed by a municipal agency and registers Jack as his domestic
partner under New York City's domestic partnership ordinance.' On a
glorious autumn weekend in 2000 they travel to Vermont where, in a blaze
of color highlighted by the turning leaves, they enter into a civil union.
They then return to New York City. Regretfully, domestic bliss does not
follow and they soon separate. Sometime later Will enters into a new
relationship with Joe. Will seeks to register Joe as his new domestic partner
with the City of New York personnel administration. Jack initiates a law
suit seeking injunctive relief to have Will declared still a participant in the
civil union pursuant to Vermont law and therefore unable to name anyone
else as his domestic partner without formally dissolving his civil union.
B. Hypothetical No. 2
Will Truman and Jack McFarland are residents of Vermont. They enter
into a Civil Union pursuant to Vermont's Statute. Sometime thereafter they
move to State X. Domestic bliss, however, does not move with them. Some
time thereafter Will meets Grace Adler, a rich socialite, and decides that
sexual orientation is less important than money. He and Grace get married.
Jack learns of the marriage and seeks a declaratory judgment in StateXthat
the marriage is void because Will is disabled from marrying because his
previous civil union with Jack in Vermont was never legally dissolved.
III. VERMONT CIVIL UNIONS
Initial hopes for the approval of same-sex marriage rested on the State
of Hawaii. The Supreme Court of Hawaii in 1993, in Baehr v. Lewin,'
20See supra notes 141-48 and accompanying text.
21With apologies to the producers, writers, and cast of the NBC sitcom Will &
Grace.
12 NEw YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 3-240 (2000).
' Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
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declared the ban on same-sex marriage unconstitutional based on the Equal
Protection Clause in the Hawaii Constitution.24 On remand, the trial court
also found the ban unconstitutional, s but before the case could work its
way back to the Hawaii Supreme Court, state voters adopted a constitu-
tional amendment granting the legislature the power to reserve marriage to
opposite-sex couples. The Supreme Court of Hawaii ultimately declared
the case moot, although specifically declining to vacate its prior ruling.27
In the same month that litigation ended in Hawaii, the State of Vermont
visited the issue of same-sex marriage. In Baker v. Vermont,28 the Supreme
Court of Vermont held that the denial of benefits to same-sex couples was
a violation of the state constitution's Common Benefits Clause.29 The court
held that a same-sex couple in Vermont, even if prohibited from marrying,
was still entitled to the legal benefits of marriage granted to a male-female
couple."0 The supreme court directed the State Legislature to adopt either
a domestic partnership statute or to grant the right to marry to same-sex
couples.
3'
The Legislature, in its response, ultimately created a new creature: the
civil union.32 Although the state's marriage statute was clarified to define
marriage as specifically between a male and a female,33 the Legislature
went further. It created a new type of quasi-marriage that granted to same-
sex couples entering a civil union all the benefits of marriage granted by
state law to any other married Vermont couple.'
24 ld at 63-68.
s Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *22 (Haw. Cir. Ct.
1996), rev'd, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999) (unpublished table decision).
26 HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 23. "The legislature shall have the power to reserve
marriage to opposite-sex couples."
27 Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999) (unpublished table opinion).
2 Baker v. Vermont 744 A2d 864 (Vt. 1999).29Id at 866.
3 0 Id
31 Id at 886-87.
32 An Act Relating to Civil Unions, 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91.
33 Id § 1(1).
34 "As used in this chapter: (2) 'Civil union' means that two eligible persons
have established a relationship pursuant to this chapter, and may receive the
benefits and protections and be subject to the responsibilities of spouses." VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201(2) (Supp. 2000).
The purpose of this act is to respondto the constitutional violation found by
the Vermont Supreme Court in Baker v. State, and to provide eligible same-
sex couples the opportunity to 'obtain the same benefits and protections
afforded by Vermont law to married opposite-sex couples' as required by
2000-2001] 1079
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The Civil Union is much more than just a sophisticated "domestic
partnership." Domestic partnership legislation has been adopted by the
State of Hawaii and by numerous cities and other municipalities throughout
the country." There are two essential functions of such an ordinance. The
first is registration; that is, to allow couples who believe they fall within the
definition to register with the municipality. The second function is the
receipt of benefits. Sometimes these functions are combined in a single
ordinance; sometimes they are separate. What is noteworthy about the
benefits provisions, however, concerns the grant of authority. With the
exception of the Hawaii statute, all the otherjurisdictions that have adopted
this type of legislation are under a limited grant of authority from the state.
In some instances the breadth of benefits has been successfully challenged
as beyond the delegation of authority under controlling state law.3"
More importantly, the establishment ofa domestic partnership is purely
the determination of the two parties involved, and the municipality's only
function is to accept the self-selected couple's registration. Registration
implies no official sanction or acceptance, although one could certainly
argue that the mere fact of allowing the registration at all implicates some
form of municipal approval.
This is where the civil union differs. The civil union is an official form
of recognition granted to same-sex couples in a manner similar to that
granted to married couples. To enter into a civil union, the parties must
obtain a license and must participate in a civil or religious ceremony to
establish the union, the same as for a marriage. The civil union ceremony
is not restricted to Vermont residents.37 Any couple that travels to Vermont
may celebrate a civil union, thereby separating the ceremonial establish-
ment of the union from the benefits conferred, as the latter are not available
Chapter I, Article 7th ofthe Vermont Constitution.
2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91, §-2(a). See also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204
(Supp. 2000) (securing the same rights to parties of civil unions as those enjoyed
by spouses in marriage).
3 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C (Supp. 1999); S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE
§ 62 (1991); O'Brien, supra note 12.
36 See, e.g., Lilly v. Minneapolis, No. MC93-21375, 1994 WL 315620 (Minn.
Dist. Ct., June 3, 1994), aft'd, 527 N.W.2d 107 (Mim. App. Ct. 1995). But see
Crawford v. Chicago, 710 N.E.2d 91 (Ill. App. CL 1999).
37 VT. STAT. ANN. tit 18, § 5160(a) (2000). "The license shall be issued by the
clerk of the town where either party resides or, if neither is a resident of the state,
by any town clerk in the state." Id See also Carey Goldberg, Gay and Lesbian
Couples Headfor Vermont to Make It Legal, but How Legal Is It?, N.Y. TIMES,
July 23, 2000, at A12.
1080 [VOL. 89
VERMONT CIVIL UNIONS
outside Vermont. Further, the procedure for the dissolution of a civil union
appears to be identical to that of a marriage.3 In no jurisdiction where a
domestic partnership exists must one seek judicial imprimatur to dissolve
the relationship. Unlike the mere registration of a domestic partnership, the
ceremonial requirement of the civil union creates a relationship officially
recognized by the State of Vermont. More than merely having the
municipality note the pair's own determination of themselves as a couple,
the civilly-united couple's legal status flows from the state itself. The state
creates it and the state accepts it.
While the Legislature concedes that only benefits granted under the
Vermont statutes will be eligible for coverage, 9 the Civil Union Law
nevertheless defines who may and who may not enter into a civil union. °
Most importantly, and distinguishing the civil union from domestic
partnerships, the statute also disables a person in a civil union from
entering into another civil union or a marriage.4' By restricting the ability
of a member ofa civil union to many, Vermont has accepted this new form
of relationship as the equivalent of marriage. In fact, it cannot be termi-
nated unless dissolved in a manner virtually identical to a civil divorce for
married couples.
IV. THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE
One could surmise that Vermont's sister states would jump at the
opportunity to voluntarily recognize this new quasi-marriage and would
honor the marital disability status in the Civil Union Law. We must,
however, consider the possibility that one or more states will decline to do
SO.
'8 See 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1206 (2000).
The family court shall have jurisdiction over all proceedings relating to
the dissolution of civil unions. The dissolution of civil unions shall follow
the same procedures and be subject to the same substantive rights and
obligations that are involved in the dissolution of marriage in accordance
with chapter 11 of this title, including any residency requirements.
Id.; see also id. § 1204 (describing the benefits, protections, and responsibilities of
parties to a civil union). "The law of domestic relations, including annulment,
separation and divorce, child custody and support, and property division and
maintenance shall apply to parties to a civil union." Id. § 1204(d).
" An Act Relating to Civil Unions, 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91, § 2(a); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (Supp. 2000).
40 VT. STAT. ANN.tit. 15, § 1202.
412000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91, § 24.
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The issue becomes whether the other states will be compelled to accept
Vermont's legislative declaration that an individual engaged in a civil
union may not otherwise marry. The inquiry has its foundation in the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution.
Article IV, Section I states:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings ofevery other State. And the Congress
may prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings
shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.42
Courts have been compelled, in a variety of contexts, to determine an
individual's marital status. General examples include prosecutions for
bigamy, determinations of administrators for intestate estates, claims for
wrongful death, claims for spousal insurance proceeds, prosecutions for
juvenile delinquency, and determinations of immigration status. The
inquiry as to marital status revolves around two related, but distinct issues.
In the first situation, the court must determine whether a marriage was
validly contracted. In the second, the query concerns the valid dissolution
of a marriage. In both situations, one state is rendering a decision on events
that occurred in a different state, and the ultimate issue is whether the
claimed marital status (marriage or divorce) shall be honored under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the federal Constitution.
A. History of the Clause
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution,"
while it did not receive much debate at the Constitutional Convention,'
was enacted to require universal acceptance by the states of the laws and
legal judgments of the United States and the sister states. While the case
42 U.S. CONST. arL IV, § 1.
43 Id
I For a discussion of the history and purpose of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, see Jennie R. Shuld-Kunze, Note, The "Defenseless" Marriage Act: The
Constitutionality ofthe Defense ofMarriage Act as an Extension of Congressional
Power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 351
(1998). See also Paige E. Chabora, Congress' Power under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, 76 NEB. L. REv. 604
(1997); James M. Patten, Comment, The Defense ofMarriageAct: How Congress
Said "No'" to Full Faith and Credit andthe Constitution, 38 SANTACLARAL.REv.
939 (1998).
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law involving this clause has not been-overwhelming, the question of state
recognition of marriage and divorce by other states has been discussed in
numerous decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the issue in a
few cases and the states have been forced to interpret the section on
frequent occasions. Often the states have discussed the clause in accepting
or declining to accept marital status as determined by a marriage or divorce
in another jurisdiction.45
In its initial review of the clause, the Supreme Court discussed the
effect of an act of the First Congress that provided for the authentication of
records and judicial proceedings. The Court stated that a "record duly
authenticated shall have such faith and credit as it has in the state Court
from whence it is taken" and "it must have the same faith and credit in
every other Court." This doctrine was affirmed in Hampton v. M'Connel.
In declining to distinguish Mills, the Court held: "[T]hejudgment of a state
court should have the same credit, validity, and effect, in every other court
of the United States, which it had in the state where it was pronounced." '47
On subsequent occasions, the Court has afftuned the wide breadth of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause. For example, in Fauntleroy v. Lum, the
Court required Mississippi to uphold a Missouri judgment for a debt
created by "gambling transactions in cotton futures," which was a
misdemeanor in Mississippi at the time.48 The Court held that, once
resolved, a second court may not review a firstjudgment as a matter of law,
except as to want of subject matter or personal jurisdiction.49
Of particular importance regarding the effect of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause on Vermont's Civil Union Act is whether a statute is entitled
to recognition from other states. This question was answered affirmatively
in Broderick v. Rosner, where the Court held statutes to be" 'public acts'
within the meaning of the clause."' Even where Congress has not
45 See infra Part IV.B.
' Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481,484 (1813).
47 Hampton v. M'Connel, 16 U.S. (3 Wheaton) 234,235 (1818).
4
1 Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230,233 (1908).
491 Id at 237. "A judgment is conclusive as to all the media concludendi and it
needs no authority to show that it cannot be impeached either in or out of the State
by showing that it was based on a mistake of law. Of course a want of jurisdiction
over either the person or the subject-matter might be shown." Id. (citations
omitted).
o Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 644 (1935) (citations omitted). "Where
a State has had jurisdiction of the subjectmatter and the parties, obligations validly
imposed upon them by statute must... be given full faith and credit by all the other
States." Id. at 645; see also Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145,
2000-20011 1083
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prescribed the method of choosing between competing state statutes,51 the
inquiry must still be made.52
There are exceptions to the clause,53 but even these exceptions do not
allow one state to substitute its own laws to overrule ajudgment previously
issued in another state. In fact, the exceptions most frequently concern two
issues: lack of subject matter or personal jurisdiction. The Court has noted
that "it is established that the full faith and credit clause, and the statutes
enacted thereunder, do not apply to judgments rendered by a court having
no jurisdiction of the parties or subject-matter, or of the res in proceedings
in rem." Thus, one state does not have the authority to adjudicate the
status of property in a sister state 5 On the other hand, while divorce
adjudicates the marital res, it is not strictly an in rem proceeding, and
divorce judgments are subject to the same rules for the applicability of full
faith and credit as other types of judgments.56 Even the issue of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant is not always open to collateral attack,
especially if the issue was fully litigated in the fist state. If the defendant,
dissatisfied with the result, attempts a collateral attack in a sister state, the
second state must give full faith and credit to the existing judgment.
154-55 (1932) (declaring that it is settled that a statute is a "public acf within the
meaning of the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
51 See Bradford Elec., 286 U.S. at 154-55.
52Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Indus. Comm'n of Cal., 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
s See Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 273 (1935).
Generally, one state is not required to enforce the penal laws of another. In
Milwaukee County, the Court assumed, without so holding, that one court need not
allow its courts to be used for a sister state to enforce its revenue laws, but that a
judgment already obtained for unpaid taxes was still entitled to full fhith and credit.
Id
' Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U.S. 551, 561 (1913),
55 Olmsted v. Olmsted, 216 U.S. 386,395 (1910) ("The legislature of Michigan
had no power to pas an act which would affect the transmission of title to lands
located in the State of New York."); Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186, 195 (1900)
(finding no violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause where the state where
property is located applies its own law for the devolution of title, even if another
state desires subject matter jurisdiction over the title).
'Athertonv. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901) (flndinghusband's domicileasthe
sole marital domicile and requiring New York to honor the Kentucky divorce
decree upon adequate service to the wife).
" Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32,40(1938).
[The wife] may not say that [the husband] was not entitled to sue for
divorce in the [Virginia] court, for she appeared there and by plea put in
issue his allegation as to domicil, introduced evidence to show it false, took
1084 (VOL. 89
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Also, the Court has not shied away from requiring that full faith and
credit be given to statejudgments regarding family issues. For example, the
Court has consistently held that federal courts have no jurisdiction over the
subject of divorce."
B. Is the Marriage Valid? Lex Loci
Each state, the District of Columbia, and the territories maintain
separate and unique rules for contracting into marriage. The statutes
regulate not only marital procedures, including licensing and solemnization,
but also regulate substantively in specifying who may and may not marry.
Such substantive laws include those addressing age, consanguinity or
affinity, and polygamy. Marriages contracted under common-law proce-
dures are no less subject to state regulation.5 9
The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that marriages "not
polygamous or incestuous, or otherwise declared void by statute, will, if
valid by the law of the State where entered into, be recognized as valid in
every other jurisdiction." The issue in Loughran was the validity of a
Florida marriage where the wife had previously been the guilty party in a
District of Columbia divorce and was therefore prohibited from remarrying.
The District of Columbia refused to enforce her dower and alimony rights
exceptions to the commissioner's report, and sought to have the court
sustain them and uphold her plea. Plainly, the determination of the decree
upon that point is effective for all purposes in this litigation.
Id. at 40 (citation omitted). Plainly, a litigant gets one bite at the apple, not two.
58 Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 584 (1858). "We disclaim altogether any
jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the subject of divorce, or for the
allowance of alimony, either as an originalproceeding in chancery or as an incident
to divorce a vinculo, or to one from bed and board." Id. at 584.
" Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Chase, 294 F.2d 500, 503-04 (1961) (noting that,
where the alleged common law marriage is entered into in the District of Columbia
by domiciles of New Jersey on a temporary visit, the law of the state of domicile
applies as "the one most interested in the status and welfare ofthe parties"); United
States v. Lawton, 19 M.J. 886,889 (1985) ("Military law recognizes the legitimacy
of marriages by service personnel if valid in the state in which they are contracted.
This is true whether the marriage complies either with state licensing or ceremonial
requirements or applicable rules governing common law marriages." (citation
omitted)); Smallwood v. Bickers, 229 S.E.2d 525, 526-27 (Ga. App. 1976)
(holding that plaintiff should have been permitted to prove a valid marriage to
decedent in Alabama after his divorce in Georgia from his first wife and that the
Georgia statutory prohbition on remarriage had no territorial effect).
o Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216,223 (1933).
2000-2001] 1085
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against her husband's estate, claiming the Florida marriage was invalid
because of the prohibition.61 The Supreme Court reversed, noting that the
"mere statutory prohibition" against remarriage could only be given
territorial effect.62 The Court declined to consider whether the Florida
marriage might be invalid if the parties had gone there solely to evade the
District's prohibition, finding that the section on prohibition was not, by
reference, included in the evasion statute.
Loughran illustrates three well-established principles regarding the
determination whether one state must give full faith and credit to a marriage
contracted elsewhere. First, the general principle of lex loci governs; that
is, one looks to the law of the jurisdiction wherein the marriage is
solemnized to determine its validity. Second, states may enact statutes to
preventtheirdomiciliaries from evading restrictions on remarriage. Finally,
there is a public policy exception under which one state may decline to
honor a marriage contracted elsewhere if it violates the public policy of the
reviewing state.63
Marriage is particularly a creature of the state.
The law has long recognized that while marriage is founded on contrac-
tual principles, it is a status which society, acting through the State,
6i Id
62 d. ("Such a statute does not invalidate a marriage solemnized in another state
in conformity with the laws thereof.").63 d Other principles are applicable in the context of marriages contracted in
foreign countries. Most notably, recognition of foreign marriages implicates
comity, not full faith and credit, and the rules may differ depending on the
jurisdiction. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES § 12.2, at 431 & n.36 (2d ed. 1988).
Recognition of foreign marriage is, of course, of some interest to the question
at hand, because some foreign countries are now recognizing quasi-marriages for
same-sex couples. Of particular interest is the recently-passed Dutch model, an
actual marriage for same-sex couples, although that nation's Parliament appears to
have restricted the availability of such unions to situations where at least one party
is a Dutch citizen or has his or her domicile or habitual residence in the
Netherlands. See Kees Waaldijk, Dutch Gays Win Marriage Rights, LESBIAN/GAY
LAW NOTES, at 2 (Jan. 2001). Still, the possibility exists that such a couple may
thereafter legally findthemselves inthe United States seeking enforcement of some
benefit as a married couple. The objections may be similar to those against
polygamous marriages. Again, the rule of law is comity, not full faith and credit,
and thus beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Comparative Law and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate: A Step-By-Step Approach
Toward State Recognition, 31 MCGEORGE L. REv. 641 (2000).
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fosters and encourages. The State has a vital interest in matters surround-
ig a marriage and for this reason has the right to enact laws governing
marriages. It is generally recognized that a marriage performed in another
State which is valid under its laws will be recognized as valid in this
State."
Early courts implied that it was the duty of the states to encourage
marriage, thus recognition out-of-state was essential.
It is the uniform policy of civilized countries, especially those affected by
the influence of Christianity, to encourage marriage as the basis of
organized society, and to recognize as valid all such as do not offend the
essentials of that faith. From this flows the doctrine that a marriage,
lawful in the state where contracted, is valid everywhere. 65
Generally, courts have recognized that marriage performs many valuable
functions for society and that it is to society's benefit to affirm the validity
of a marriage, whenever possible.'
64 State v. Austin, 234 S.E.2d 657, 662-63 (W. Va. 1977) (citation omitted).
Defendant left West Virginia to utilize the laws of Maryland to many a person
under the age of consent in West Virginia, and was subsequently convicted of
contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Because under the laws of both West
Virginia and Maryland, the marriage was only voidable and not void, and because
marriage emancipates a minor and it is not a crime to reside with one's spouse, the
conviction was reversed. Id at 662-64; see also Spencer v. People, 292 P.2d 971
(Colo. 1956) (holding that entrance into a marriage contract, regardless of age, is
not an act of delinquency).
65 Modianos v. Tuttle, 12 F.2d 927, 928 (1925). In Modianos, a Louisiana
resident celebrated amarriage by procuration (proxy) in Turkey. The courtheld that
the applicable prohibition extended only to marriages contracted within the state,
and that the celebration by proxy was only for the sake of convenience and was not
designed to evade the statutory prohibition. The wife, therefore, was allowed to
become a citizen without regard to any quota. Id at 928-29.
"For further discussion of the social benefits of marriage, see, for example,
RICHARD D. MOHR, A MORE PERFECT UNION-WHY STRAIGHT AMERICA MUST
STAND UP FOR GAY RIGHTS (1994); Lynn D. Wardle, Legal Claimsfor Same-Sex
Marriage: Efforts to Legitimate a Retreatfrom Marriage by Redefining Marriage,
39 S. TEX. L. REV. 735 (1998); Anthony Dominic D'Amato, Note, Conflict of
Laws Rules and the Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 1995 U. ILL.
L. REV. 911; Note, Family, Marriage, and the Same-Sex Couple, 12 CARDOZO L.
REV. 681 (1990).
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Generally, the validity of a marriage is determined by the law of the
state where the marriage is solemnized-the "lex loci"--of the marriage.
While there may be exceptions to this rule, the policy of many states is to
uphold any marriage entered into in good faith.67 This principle is outlined
in the Restatement (Second) Conflict ofLaws, which seeks to uphold good
faith marriages, especially when (1) a state other than the state of domicile
is the state of paramount interest, (2) one party is not domiciled there, and
(3) neither intends to reside there after marriage." Even the military
recognizes and honors the law of the contracting state in determining the
validity of the marriages of service personnel.69
To be sure, the law does not generally prohibit the residents of one
state from marrying in another state. As stated by one court:
The status of citizens of a state in respect to the marriage relation is
fixed and determined by the law of the state, but marriages of citizens of
one state celebrated in another state, which would be valid there, are
generally recognized as fixing the status in the state of the domicile with
certain exceptions, such as marriages which are incestuous, according to
the generally recognized belief of Christian nations, polygamous, or
which are declared by positive law to have no validity in the state ofthe
domicile. 0
67See, e.g., Garrett v. Chapman, 449 P.2d 856, 858 (Or. 1969).
RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 283 (1971).
The Restatement reads as follows:
§ 283. Validity of Marriage
(1) The validity of a marriage will be determined by the local law of the
state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most significant
relationship to the spouses and the marriage....
(2) A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the
marriage was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless
it violates the strong public policy of another state which had the most
significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the
marriage.
Id For a thorough treatment of the Restatement position regarding the validity of
marriage, see Mark Strasser, For Whom Bell Tolls: On Subsequent Domiciles'
Refusing to Recognize Same-Sex Marriages, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 339, at 342-52
(1998).
9 United States v. Lawton, 19 M.J. 886 (1985).
70 Stevens v. Stevens, 136 N.E. 785,786 (111. 1922). In this case, the couple left
Illinois to marry in Indiana specifically to avoid an evasion statute. Though the
marriage was valid in Indiana, Illinois subsequently found invalid the marriage of
its domiciles. Id at 787. In the current era of no-fault divorce and general
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One exception to this rule appears to be that the residents of one state may
not specifically go to another state only for the purpose of entering into a
common law marriage, at least unless their domicile changes."
Some states have enacted statutes to specifically recognize the validity
of marriages contracted elsewhere. Under such statutes, even where the
marriage may not be legally contracted in the reviewing state, it will be
recognized ifvalid where solemnized.' The Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act proposes the following language for approval of other marriages: "All
marriages contracted... outside this State, that were valid at the time of the
contract or subsequently validated by the laws of the place in which they
were contracted or by the domicil of the parties, are valid in this State."
Public policy exceptions to the interstate recognition of marriage
appear to be limited. Although no state currently allows any marriage to be
elimination ofprohibitions on remarriage, one queries whether such a prohibition
might now run afoul of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment
1' Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Chase, 294 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1961). Although it
appears that the New Jersey domiciliaries did not travel to the District of Columbia
specifically to enter into a common law marriage, such was the claim retroactively
made by the alleged wife after the death of her putative husband. In fact, she
claimed a continuation of an already existing common law relationship, arguing
that the trip to the District of Columbia merely heightened it to the level of
marriage. Generally, though, there must be specific intent to establish a common
law marriage by two parties with the capacity to marry in ajurisdiction permitting
such marriages to be contracted. See, e.g., Jennings v. Hurt, 554 N.Y.S.2d 220
(App. Div. 1990).
1 Spencer v. People, 292 P.2d 971,973 (Colo. 1956) (en bane); Leszinske v.
Poole, 798 P.2d 1049, 1053 (N.M. 1990). In Spencer, the Colorado statute at issue
did not allow bigamy or polygamy but allowed underage marriages validly
celebrated in Utah. Spencer, 292 P.2d at 973. The New Mexico statute in Leszinske
contained no such limitations. Leszinske was a custody case where the mother, after
her divorce, married her uncle in Costa Rica, a marriage defined as incestuous
under New Mexico law. The divorce trial court had granted her custody
conditioned on such a marriage and the father appealed. Leszinske, 798 P.2d at
1051. The divorce decree was entered and the new marriage took place prior to the
issuance of written findings of fact and conclusions of law but after the oral
decision of the trial judge. Id The court of appeals found that California, which
was to be the state of domicile and home state of the subject children, would
recognize an uncle-niece marriage validly contracted in Costa Rica. Id at 1056.
The trial judge, therefore, properly considered the parties' circumstances in the
custody determination. Id
73 UNI. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 210 (1970), 9A U.L.A. 156 (1987)
(emphasis added).
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solemnized where one of the parties is still legally married, there or
elsewhere, nevertheless bigamy and polygamy are oft-stated limitations on
marriage.'
The same is true for incest, but even here the policy is not uniform
because state laws are not uniform on prohibited degrees of consanguinity.
A leading case is In re May's Estate.75 There, an uncle and his half-niece,
both of the Jewish faith, appear to have traveled to Rhode Island specifi-
cally for the purpose of utilizing its marriage statute, which created an
exception to the incest rules for such a relationship.76 They then returned
to New York where they lived for thirty-two years.77 Upon the wife's death,
three of the children challenged their father's right to letters of administra-
tion.78 In finding the marriage valid, the court reiterated the general
proposition that absent a statute in the state of domicile regulating
marriages performed elsewhere, the legality of the marriage should be
determined by the law of the place of celebration.79 The court further held
that there was "no 'positive law' in [New York] which serve[d] to interdict
the ... marriage."
80
It is noteworthy, however, that there are cases holding to the contrary.
For example, in Mortenson v. Mortenson, Arizona declined to recognize a
New Mexico marriage between first cousins because it specifically violated
Arizona's evasion prohibition.8 ' The court noted: "A marriage declared
void by our statute cannot be purified or made valid by merely stepping
across the state line for purpose of solemnization. We cannot permit the
public policy of this state to be defeated by such tactics."' 2
The public policy exception to the general recognition of a foreign
marriage is limited. At least one court has held that the marriage must be
recognized as valid unless it violated a "strong" public policy in the
74See Garrett v. Chapman, 449 P.2d 856 (Or. 1969).
75 In re May's Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1953).76 Id at 5.
77Id
79d. at 6.
8 Id at 7. The court did note, however, that "had the Legislature been so dis-
posed it could have declared by appropriate enactment that marriages contracted
in another State-which if entered into [in New York] would be void-shall have
no force in [New York]." Id.
8 Mortenson v. Mortenson, 316 P.2d 1106 (Ariz. 1957).
Ild at 1107. Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Arizona never made a finding
that appellee and decedent went to New Mexico for the sole purpose of evading
Arizona's statute. Id
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domicile state. 3 Another court has stated the rule to limit non-recognition
to marriages "repugnant" to its laws or policies.' Another has stated the
exceptions to include "marriages which are contrary to the general view of
Christendom."" Even then, the marriage may still be recognized. In one
case, a New Jersey court noted the "strong public policy of protecting
children against underage marriages,"" yet recognized a Maryland
underage marriage because, even under New Jersey law, it was only
voidable, not absolutely void.' The Uniform Marriage & Divorce Act
seems to recognize the trend towards interstate recognition by eliminating
the "strong public policy" exception.'
Although one Illinois court refused to recognize an Indiana marriage in
contravention of a post-divorce waiting period, 9 other states have held
differently.' In Loughran v. Loughran, the Suprem6 Court held that the
District of Columbia's remarriage restriction could only be given territorial
effect.9'
It appears, in fact, that the public policy exception will not even be
considered unless a similar marriage contracted in the state of domicile is
absolutely void. Therefore, underage marriages, being only voidable, are
3 Barrons v. United States, 191 F.2d 92,94 (9th Cir. 1951). The court held that
a proxy marriage in Nevada was not inconsistent with Nevada law; further, there
was no strongly conflicting public policy in the domicile state. Id at 96-99.
" State v. Austin, 234 S.E.2d 657,663 (W. Va. 1977) ("[A] state is not required
to recognize a marriage performed in another State which is repugnant to the
former State's statutes or public policy." (citing Spradlin v. State Comp. Comm'r,
113 S.E.2d 832 (W. Va. 1960)).
5 Modianos v. Tuttle, 12 F.2d 927,928 (E.D. La. 1925).
86Exrel. S.L, 173 A.2d 457, 460 (N.J. 1961). Nevertheless, the court sustained
the delinquency petition, although the common law rule was that marriage
emancipated a minor, especially a female. Id.; see also In re Henry v. Boyd, 473
N.Y.S.2d 892 (App. Div. 1984).
E Lx rel. S.L, 173 A.2d at 460.88See Leszinske v. Poole, 798 P.2d 1049, 1054 (N.M. 1990).
89 Stevens v. Stevens, 136 N.E. 785 (111. 1922).
o Smallwood v. Bickers, 229 S.E.2d 525 (Ga. App. 1976); Garrett v. Chapman,
449 P.2d 856 (Or. 1969).
9' Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 223 (1934). While the District of
Columbia had a statutory provision declaring void certain marriages even if
contracted elsewhere, the Court held that the statute specifically related to
marriages that were void because of incest or polygamy, or voidable because of
lunacy, underage, impotence, or procured by force or fraud. Id at 224. It also
appears that Florida, and not the District of Columbia, became the domicile of the
marriage in question. Id at 225.
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generally entitled to recognition, even where a couple specifically evaded
the domicile's age restriction.9 In fact, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled
that, even though a marriage would be void in Michigan because a party
was underage, a suit for annulment could only be entertained in the state of
celebration (Indiana). Even though the parties had gone to Indiana for the
specific purpose of evading Michigan's age restrictions and there was no
marital domicile in Indiana, only that state could annul the marriage under
the lex loci doctrine. 3 Interstate recognition is only denied where the
legislature has, as a matter of public policy, declared such a marriage has
no validity or is completely void.' Even being void in the state of domicile,
however, does not automatically cause lack of recognition if valid in the
state where contracted.' Other examples where courts found no public
.policy exception to the interstate recognition of marriage include proxy
marriage.9
Some states have interpreted the evasion statutes as "nothing more than
a statutory extension of the common law rule that a State is not required to
recognize a marriage performed in another State which is repugnant to the
former State's statutes or public policy."97 Many violations of the evasion
statutes, however, have been held not to rise to the level of a public policy
violation? On the other hand, Illinois refused to recognize an Indiana
marriage where it found that the couple had gone there only to evade a
prohibition on remarriage. In Stevens v. Stevens, the Illinois Supreme Court
held:
[To] recognize the validity of such marriage celebrated by crossing the
state line to evade the laws ofthis state wouldrender legislation futile and
ascribe practical imbecility to the Legislature to make and enforce public
' Spencer v. Spencer, 292 P.2d 971 (Colo. 1956); Ex rel. S.I., 173 A.2d at 457;
State v. Austin, 234 S.E.2d 657 (W. Va. 1977).
93 Noble v. Noble, 300 N.W. 885 (Mich. 1941); see also Romatz v. Romatz, 78
N.W.2d 160 (Mich. 1956).
9 Modianos v. Tuttle, 12 F.2d 927 (E.D. La. 1925); Mortenson v. Mortenson,
316 P.2d 1106 (Ark 1957).
9sIn re May's Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1953).
s Barrons v. United States, 191 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1951); Modianos, 12 F.2d at
927.
97 State v. Austin, 234 S.E.2d 657, 663 (W. Va. 1977).
" Even where a couple went to Maryland to evade New Jersey's age
restrictions, the marriage was recognized as valid because it was only voidable
under New Jersey law and not automatically void. Ex rel. S.I., 173 A2d 457,460
(N.J. 1961).
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policy and govern the domestic relations of its citizens, and... such a
marriage is absolutely void."
C. Williams v. North Carolina and Marital Status
The application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to a determination
of marital status has been addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the
seminal case of Williams v. North Carolina (Williams I ). ° In Williams I,
both defendants, longtime residents of North Carolina, traveled to Nevada,
where each obtained a divorce from a North Carolina spouse."' The
divorce decrees found that each had been a "bona fide and continuous
resident" of Nevada for more than six weeks immediately preceding the
commencement of the actions. 2 On the same day that the second decree
was granted, Williams and Hendrix married in Nevada; they then returned
to North Carolina where they were prosecuted for bigamy.0 3 Their defense
was that they were duly divorced by and remarried in the state of Nevada,
and that North Carolina was therefore required to honor the new marriage
pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause."°4
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed, finding that North Carolina's interest
in Nevada's domiciliaries could not be superior to the interest of Nevada.0 s
The Court went on to say:
" Stevensv. Stevens, 136 N.E. 785,787 (Ill. 1922). Interestingly, the restriction
against remarriage alleged by the wife was contained in an Arkansas divorce
decree. At the time of the divorce, however, she was already an Illinois resident,
and the Illinois statute contained grounds and restrictions comparable to Arkansas.
Id at 786-87.
'00 Williams v. North Carolina (Williams I), 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
The wife of Defendant OB. Williams was personally served by a sheriff in
North Carolina. The husband of Defendant Carrie Hendrix was served by
publication in a Las Vegas newspaper with mailing to his last post office address.
Neither spouse was served in Nevada nor did either enter any appearance in the
divorce actions. Id at 289-90.
1o2 I at 290.
103 Id
104 Id
'1 Interestingly, the Court also found that the word "reside" in the Nevada
statute meant a domicile rather than a'mere residence." This can be an issue in the
determination of lex loci because, while many states use the term "domicile" in
allowing use of the courts for the purpose of divorce, others, such as New York,
clearly use residence. Id at 298. Compare Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975),
with N.Y. DOM. REL. L. § 170 (McKinney's 1999).
While no state appears to restrict its marriage laws to domiciliaries or residents,
a few states do have evasion laws which prohibit a domiciliary from marrying in
a sister state specifically to avoid a restriction on marriage. See, e.g., supra note 83
and accompanying text. Vermont's Civil Union Law is not restricted to Vermont
domiciliaries or residents. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 78, § 5160(a) (2000).
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[E]ach state, by virtue of its command over its domiciliaries and its large
interest in the institution of marriage, can alter within its own borders the
marital status of the spouse domiciled there, even though the other spouse
is absent.... It therefore follows that, if the Nevada decrees are taken at
their full face value..., they were wholly effective to change in that state
the marital status of the petitioners and each of the other spouses by the
North Carolina marriages.
... The existence of the power of a state to alter the marital status of
its domiciliaries, as distinguished from the wisdom of its exercise... is
dependent on the relationship which domicil creates and the pervasive
control which a state has over marriage and divorce within its own
borders.' °
As the subject relates to the topic of this Article, some courts may try
to prevent recognition of Vermont's civil union on moral grounds. In a
statement potentially applicable to this particular issue of morality, the
Court has noted that while "the realm of morals and religion" rests with the
states,"0 7 a conflict between the public policy of two states was not
sufficient justification to except from the Full Faith and Credit Clause the
determination of marital status granted in accord with the requirements of
procedural due process.1°'
After Williams I, North Carolina did not accept the Supreme Court
decision; the bigamy prosecutions were pursued, the state alleging that
Nevada had not had proper jurisdiction over the defendants to render the
divorces.
Upon review after Williams I, a North Carolina jury found that the
defendants had not abandoned their North Carolina domiciles when they
went to Nevada. The latter state, therefore, could not exercise proper
jurisdiction over the North Carolina defendants and thus the divorces were
rendered nullities. Upon review a second time, this determination was
'06 Id. at 298-300.107 Id. at 303.
108
[W]hen a court of one state acting in accord with... procedural due
process alters the marital status of one domiciled in that state by granting
him a divorce from his absent spouse, we cannot say its decree should be
excepted from the full faith and credit clause merely because its
enforcement or recognition in another state would conflict with the policy
of the latter.
1094 [VOL. 89
VERMONT CIVIL UNIONS
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court, °9 although the bigamy prosecutions
were ultimately dropped."' While the Court held thatNevada's determina-
tions of domicile was entitled to "respect, and more,.'. the Court allowed
sister states to question the jurisdiction on which they were based. The
Court further found, in the particular context, that North Carolina had
accorded proper weight to the Nevada finding and the jury's ultimate
finding that defendants were non-domiciliaries could therefore be upheld.I"
In summarizing the importance of its holding in Williams I, the Court
stated:
Divorce, like marriage, is of concern not merely to the immediate parties.
It affects personal rights of the deepest significance. It also touches basic
interests of society. Since divorce, like marriage, creates a new status,
every consideration of policy makes it desirable that the effect should be
the same wherever the question arises." 3
Williams Iestablished the principle that, in the determination of marital
status, the celebrating state's law shall be applied. That means that the state
that grants the marriage or grants the divorce, assuming it has a valid
jurisdictional basis for doing so, determines the marital status of an
individual, which is then binding on other states.
Full faith and credit, however, is only limited to those issues properly
before the court. Williams Iheld that marital status was properly before the
Court because of its quasi-in-rem status. But adivorce where anon-resident
defendant is not personally served within the jurisdiction nor appears is
ineffective in extinguishing any other rights a party may have under the
laws of their own state of domicile."4
Recognizing that Williams !lcould give rise to wholesale challenges to
jurisdiction, the Court subsequently limited collateral challenges to cases
where domicile was either not raised as an issue or where a non-resident
,0 Williams v. North Carolina (Williams I1), 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
So ee Thomas R. Powell, And Repent at Leisure, 58 HARV. L. REV. 930
(1945).
1' Williams I, 325 U.S. at 233.
"2Id. at 237.
1 Id. at 230.
". Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 418 (1957) ("It has long been the
constitutional rule that a court cannot adjudicate a personal claim or obligation
unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant."); Estin v. Estin, 334
U.S. 541 (1948).
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party did not have an opportunity to litigate. The Court held that where
both parties fully participated in the divorce proceeding and the jurisdic-
tional issue was resolved without opposition, the jurisdiction cannot be
relitigated in another forum merely, because one party is domiciled
elsewhere.
11 5
D. Defense of Marriage Act
In 1996 Congress adopted the Defense of Marriage ActY16 The Act
states in all its simplicity that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
Constitution of the United States need not be applied to same-sex mar-
riages. The first part of the Act declares that the States are not required to
grant full faith and credit to a same-sex marriage. 7 This is the first federal
law to create a substantive definition within marital law, specifically a
definition of what is not a marriage. This is most unusual considering that
for most of our history federal courts have accepted a domestic relations
exception from federal jurisdiction and generally declined to grant
jurisdiction to specific issues regarding marriage and divorce."' It is also
.15 Sherrer v. Sherter, 334 U.S. 343 (1948). In Sherrer, the Court noted:
It is one thing to recognize as permissible the judicial reexamination of
findings of jurisdictional fact where such findings have been made by a
court of a sister State which has entered a divorce decree in ex parte
proceedings. It is quite another thing to hold that the vital rights and
interests involved in divorce litigation may be held in suspense pending the
scrutiny by courts of sister States of findings ofjurisdictional fact made by
a competent court in proceedings conducted in a manner consistent with the
highest requirements of due process and in which the defendant has
participated.
Id. at 355-56.
16 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419
(1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. V 1999) and28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. IV
1998)).
117No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe,
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial
proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a
relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage
under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right
or claim arising from such relationship.
Id. § 1738C.11 See Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582 (1858).
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quite unusual for Congress to limit a constitutional provision by stating that
an inferior jurisdiction need not honor the Constitution." 9
While Congress has previously adopted legislation defining the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, this statute was designed to provide for technical
compliance with the clause. 120 In other circumstances, Congress has
attempted to enhance the states' requirement and duty to apply full faith
and credit to certain types of orders that, until then, had not been consid-
ered within the realm of the clause. Congress adopted parts of the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act' and the Full Faith and Credit of Child
Support Orders Act2' to require states to grant full faith and credit to
decisions of other states that, until then, had been considered modi-
fiable and therefore not final." Both statutes also enhance uniform state
'. Under our federal system, rights and powers are divided between the federal
government and the states, but the Constitution applies to all equally. While the
federal government may not possess constitutional authority to legislate in all areas,
when it legally exercises its authority, its rule is superior and supercedes any state
action to the contrary. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2. In this system DOMA is
unique. It exercises a function not clearly within the purview of the federal
government (by creating a definition of marriage) and then attempts a negative
interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause by telling the states what they
need not honor under the Constitution. It is highly likely that, in addition to all the
other questions about the constitutionality of DOMA, there is a Tenth Amendment
violation as well.
120 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (addressing authentication of records and the like).
,2, Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA), Pub. L. 96-611, 94
Stat. 3568 (codified at28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)). Congress, as
part of the PKPA, determined that states shall give full faith and credit to custody
determinations of sister states. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(a).
'12 Full Faith and Credit of Child Support Orders Act, Pub. L. 103-383, 108
Stat. 4063 (1994) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (Supp. IV 1998)).
2 [A]mong the results.., are the failure of the courts of such jurisdictions
to give full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of the other
jurisdictions, the deprivation of rights of liberty and property without due
process of law, burdens on commerce among such jurisdictions and with
foreign nations, and harm to the welfare of children and their parents and
other custodians.
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-611, § 7(a)(4), 94 Stat.
3568,3569.
(a) FINDINGS.-The Congress finds that... among the results of the
conditions described in this subsection are-(A) the failure of the courts of
the States to give full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of the other
States ....
(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.-In view of the findings made in
2000-2001] 1097
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
laws, 24 and, at least in child support matters, a separate statute requires
every state to have adopted the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act as
a condition for receiving financial assistance for local programs.25
The second part of the Defense of Marriage Act states that the federal
government shall not recognize same-sex marriages and shall deny federal
benefits to spouses in this type of marriage." DOMA defines "marriage?'
and "spouse' for clarification of its second clause (federal benefits), yet
this is somewhat of an anomaly because the federal government does not,
per se, recognize marriage; "marriage" is a creature of the States. 27 It is
subsection (a), it is necessary to establish national standards under which
the courts of the various States shall determine their jurisdiction to issue a
child support order and the effect to be given by each State to child support
orders issued by the courts of other States.
Full Faith and Credit of Child Support Orders Act, Pub. L. 103-383, § 2, 108 Stat.
4063,4064 (1994).
12 The PKPA was designed to enhance, clarify, and give uniform imprimatur
to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), 9 U.L.A. 115 (1988).
The federal law, however, resulted in a proposed new statute, the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (1997), 9 pt. IA U.L.A. 649 (1999),
which resolved differences between the PKPA and the UCCJA.
The Uniform Interstate Family SupportAct (1996), 9 pt. IB U.L.A. 235 (1999),
was promulgated to unify several different versions of previously uniform support
laws.
"2 "In order to satisfy section 654(20)(A) of this title, on and after January 1,
1998, each State must have in effect the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, as
approved by the American Bar Association of February 8, 1993, and as in effect
on August 22, 1996, including any amendments officially adopted as of such date
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law." Pub. L.
104-193, § 322, 110 Stat. 2221 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 666(f) (Supp. IV
1998)).
126 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419
(1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. V 1999) and U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. IV
1998)).
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and
agencies of the United States, the word"marriage" means only a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word
"spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a
wife.
Id § 7.
127 Even when the federal government has attempted to invalidate a marriage,
it has always utilized the appropriate state law, never a superceding federal law of
marriage and divorce. See, e.g., United States v. Layton, 19 M.J. 886 (1985);
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conceivable that a state could allow same-sex marriages to be celebrated,
thereby enabling legally-married couples to seek tax benefits and other
federal benefits. But this provision of DOMA attempts to forestall that
scenario.
DOMA was adopted in reaction to the initial Hawaii decision in Baehr
v. Lewin and the trial court's decision on remand that declared the state's
ban on same-sex marriage unconstitutional. 2 ' Passed in an election year
and signed in secret by President Clinton, the act purports to carve out a
"public policy" exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause. This
exception has never, however, been sanctioned by the Supreme Court, and
many argued that the Act was unconstitutional in the hearings preceding its
Congressional approval.'1 Further, many states had already adopted similar
legislation regarding same-sex marriage. Because the words of DOMA, at
least regarding interstate recognition, are permissive rather than mandatory,
the statute appears to offer nothing beyond a "sense of Congress" which is
non-binding.'
30
Many scholars have argued that the Defense of Marriage Act is patently
unconstitutional and that Congress has no power to limit the Clause, only
power to prescribe specific methods to grant such recognition.' 3 ' One of the
Barrons v. United States, 191 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1951); Modianos v. Tuttle, 12 F.2d
927 (E.D. La. 1925).
,,sSee H.R. REP.No. 104-664 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905.
129 1 d
301 f the congressional language is considered mandatory, not permissive, and
is found to be beyond the authority of Congress, then the other clause must also
fail. If the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires interstate recognition of same-sex
marriages, it should also require the federal government to recognize them.
The Congressional Report accompanying DOMA devotes a considerable
amount of discussion to its constitutionality, because the issue was challenged at
the hearings preceding the passage of the law. See H.R. REP. No. 104-664. Upon
enactment, scholars quickly produced many articles analyzing DOMA and
assessing whether it violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Most (but not all)
scholars agreed that DOMA was patently unconstitutional.
For an example of an analysis utilizing conflict of laws theories to avoid the full
constitutional issue and deny full faith and credit, see Rebecca S. Paige, Comment,
Wagging the Dog-Ifthe State ofHawail Accepts Same-Sex Marriage Will Other
States Have To?: An Examination ofConflict ofLaws and Escape Devices, 47 AM.
U. L. REV. 165 (1997).
There are numerous articles that challenge the constitutionality of the Defense
of Marriage Act. David L. Chambers, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 26
HOFSTRA L. REV. 53 (1997); Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the
Defense of Marriage Act is Unconstitutional, 83 IoWA L. REV. 1 (1997); Mark
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arguments advanced is that Congress does not have power to limit the
effect of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, only power to prescribe
procedural mechanisms for its enforcement."' Another argument chal-
lenges DOMA in light of Romer v. Evans,' finding an equal protection
violation in that DOMA has no rational or legitimate government
purpose. 34 Congress's argument that there is a public policy exception to
the Full Faith and Credit Clause has never been accepted by the Supreme
Court.3 s
The conundrum is that, by definition, a Vermont civil union is not a
marriage. It is a hybrid creature--perhaps a "super" domestic partner-
ship--yet it extends, at least to Vermont residents, the rights and privileges
of marriage. Had the Vermont Legislature specifically authorized same-sex
couples to enter into full-scale, legal marriages, then the previous discus-
Strasser, Loving the Romer outfor Baehr: On Acts in Defense ofMarriage andthe
Constitution, 58 U. Prrr. L. REV. 279 (1997); Charles J. Butler, Note, The Defense
of Marriage Act: Congress's Use of Narrative in the Debate over Same-Sex
Marriage, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 841 (1998); Diane M. Guillerman, Comment, The
Defense of Marriage Act: The Latest Maneuver in the Continuing Battle to
Legalize Same-Sex Marriage, 34 HoUs. L. REv. 425 (1997); Heather Lauren
Hughes, Note, Same-Sex Marriage and Simulacra: Exploring Conceptions of
Equality, 33 HARV. C.R. -C.L. L. REV. 237 (1998); Julie L.B. Johnson, Comment,
The Meaning of "General Laws": The Extent of Congress's Power under Full
Faith and Credit Clause and the Constitutionality ofthe Defense ofMarriage Act,
145 U. PA. L. REv. 1611 (1997); Jason Andrew Macke, Note, Of Covenants and
Conflicts-When "IDo" Means More than It Used to, ButLess Than You Thought,
59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1377 (1998); Scott Ruskay-Kidd, Note, The Defense ofMarriage
Act and the Overextension of Congressional Authority, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1435
(1997); Mark Tanney, Note, The Defense of Marriage Act: A "Bare Desire to
Harm" An Unpopular Minority Cannot Constitute a Legitimate Governmental
Interest, 19 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 99 (1997).
For an example of commentary supporting the constitutionality ofDOMA, see
Lynn D. Wardle, Williams v. North Carolina, Divorce Recognition, andSame-Sex
Marriage Recognition, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 187 (1998). Professor Wardle's
Article also includes a omprehensive appendix listing scholarship on the subject
of same-sex marriage recognition (much of which includes analyses of the
constitutionality of DOMA). Id. at 234.
'3 Chabora, supra note 45; Patten, supra note 45, at 955-56.
1 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that animus alone cannot
provide rational basis for legislation).
11 See Barbara A. Robb, Note, The Constitutionality of the Defense of
Marriage Act in the Wake ofRomer v. Evans, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 263 (1997).
3I See Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Uncon-
stitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 (1997).
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sion about the interstate effect of the Full Faith and Credit Clause would
become a major issue. But because the law limits the concept of the civil
union to something less than marriage, couples who invoke the solemniza-
tion rituals of the Civil Union Law do not achieve the full title and status
of marriage. An attempt to then transfer the status to another state and seek
benefits therefrom, or even from the federal government, should fail by
simple definition without even reaching the DOMA issue. Even Vermont
domiciliaries joined in civil union cannot seek marital haven in the statute
(such as for federal benefits). The statute is limited to state benefits, it
specifically excludes same-sex couples from the definition of marriage, and
it was necessitated by a case construing a clause in Vermont's state
constitution.
Concededly, marriage performs many valuable functions for society.
As one commentator has noted, "marriage advances the state's interest in
developing intimate and stable relationships which in turn build 'social
stability' and act as an emotional and economic support system as well as
a forum for physical intimacy."' 36 More so than the societal benefits,
however, special legal rights, benefits, and privileges are extended to those
couples who are partners in a legally established marriage, and to their
children as well.' It is no wonder, then, that Congress has invested such
energy in retention ofthe special enhanced status granted to marriage, even
to the point of adopting constitutionally-suspect legislation that refuses to
extend parity or equality to other concepts offamilial relationships between
adults. It was this enhanced status of marriage that the Vermont Supreme
Court declined to extend to the function of family and that may not bode
well for an equal protection challenge to DOMA. 13 8
'36 D'Amato, supra note 67, at 928.
'" A 1997 compilation by the U.S. General Accounting Office identified at
least 1049 federal laws classified with marital status as a factor and, as such,
presumably, would not apply to same-sex couples as a result of the Defense of
Marriage Act. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/OCG-97-16, REPORT TO THE
HONORABLE HENRYJ. HYDE, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES (1997), available at 1997 WL 67783. For a general
discussion of other rights and benefits of marriage, see Lewis A. Silverman, Suffer
the Little Children: Justifying Same-Sex Marriagefrom the Perspective ofa Child
of the Union, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 411 (1999) and the authorities cited therein.
t38 Equal protection challenges to DOMA are not addressed in this Article.
Baker v. Vermont was adjudicated on state constitutional grounds and there was
some departure from Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, although there were
many similarities. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt 1999). Romer v. Evans
offers no comfort to those seeking to challenge DOMA on equal protection
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DOMA did not anticipate the scenario of an alternate form of legally-
cognizable relationship. It specifically limits its application to a "relation-
ship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage"; 39 a
civil union, however, is not treated as a marriage. The attempt to implicate
the Defense of Marriage Act in determining the effect of a civil union
should therefore fail. The statute by its own words does not apply, and,
therefore, no DOMA challenge should arise under the Civil Union Law.
V. ANALYSIS
The previous discussions should answer concerns and resolve the issue
whether a civil union is a marriage entitled to full faith and credit. They do
not, however, resolve the issue of marital status under the Civil Union Law.
The Civil Union Law specifically prohibits a partner in a civil union from
marrying, or engaging in another civil union, until the civil union is
dissolved. 4 ' Therefore, although a same-sex couple is not "married" within
the meaning of Vermont's law, having entered into a lawful civil union the
parties are statutorily prevented from marrying elsewhere.
Left unresolved, however, is the issue whether another state will accept
the ramifications of the Civil Union Law's determination of marital status.
The status of being a civil union partner is, at least in Vermont, a disability
from marriage."' It. has already been noted that, even if a person (not
presently married) is disabled from marrying in one state, he or she may
marry in another state." Even if the couple immediately returns to the
initial state, that state may still recognize the marriage under the lex loci
doctrine. The only exception seems to be those states that have a specific
bar to their residents invoking the marriage laws of a sister state for the sole
purpose of evading their marriage disability. In this small group of states,
the marriage will not be recognized.
grounds. In that case, the Court found a violation on a rational basis analysis, the
only fimction of the statute being anti-gay animus. Romer, 517 U.S. at 620.
Depending on how a challenge is framed, the respect given by the Court to
marriage might well allow DOMA to survive at least a preliminary challenge where
marital status is the issue. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
"9 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. IV 1998).
140 See supra notes 8-9.
141 See supra notes 8-9.
142 See supra Part WV.B.
143 See, e.g., Mortenson v. Mortenson, 316 P.2d 1106 (Ariz. 1957).
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Still, that does not resolve the entire issue. In some circumstances, the
issue arises where a same-sex couple, residents of State X, who travel to
Vermont for the sole purpose of celebrating a civil union, then return to
State Xwhere they go their separate ways and one seeks to marry (or enter
into a domestic partnership) without legally dissolving the civil union.
There is another group, however. This group consists of Vermont
domiciliaries who celebrate a civil union and thereafter remain in Vermont.
Subsequently, after the passage of time, one or both leave Vermont,
establish a domicile elsewhere, and seek to many or enter a domestic
partnership with someone else without dissolving the civil union. Here,
there can be no attack on the initial lex loci; Vermont was the state of
residence. If they had entered into a legal marriage in Vermont, then one
(or both) traveled elsewhere, no state would allow another marriage without
first requiring a dissolution of the marriage by death, divorce, or annulment.
The legal status of marriage, as conferred by Vermont as the lex loci, would
bind every other state under the Full Faith and Credit Clause." Applying
the same principles, the legal status of civil union, with its statutory
prohibition of marriage, should also bind the sister states under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause. Vermont says that the couple may not many
others because they are partners in a quasi-marital relationship. As the legal
relationship is not a marriage, yet a relationship that emulates marriage, the
civil union is, in fact, previously unknown in American jurisprudence."
There is even yet another possibility. Many municipalities recognize
the domestic partnership. From Hawaii's Reciprocal Beneficiaries Law to
the ordinances of many municipalities there is an effort within the limited
powers of most local governments to grant rights and benefits to domestic
partners who are unable to marry because of the national bar against same-
sex marriage. Domestic partnerships usually involve some kind of
municipal registration by the employee-partner in order for the other to
receive benefits such as health coverage. Dissolution is, usually, relatively
simple. One partner simply notifies the registering authority, unilaterally,
that the partnership has ceased, and the benefits likewise cease.
1 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
'4s There is also the issue of citizens of one state being granted or denied
privileges and immunities under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Strasser, supra
note 69, at 376-80.
1 Common law marriage is not considered here. Though a legally binding
marriage, its difference from more traditional marriages is in the form of
celebration, not in the nature of the contract itself.
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It is possible that many of these municipalities may consider the
Vermont civil union to be legally equivalent to a domestic partnership in
their own jurisdiction. They may be willing to recognize the civil union as
a domestic partnership without further registration and subsequently extend
the appropriate benefits. What may be more interesting, however, is the
issue of dissolution. Vermont's Civil Union Law is specific: a civil union
may only be dissolved in a manner similar to dissolving a Vermont
marriage. Should one member of a domestic partnership fail to follow that
procedure, the local municipality may conclude that the domestic partner-
ship is still in effect and continue to extend benefits and recognition to the
civil union partner until Vermont dissolves the civil union.
Even more intriguing, can domestic partners invoke their own state's
divorce laws to dissolve their Vermont civil union? It is clear that an
opposite-sex couple may marry in StateX, thereafter move to State Y, and
invoke State Y's divorce mechanism to terminate their marriage. But if a
couple are civilly united in Vermont and thereafter move to State Y, will
State Yequate the civil union with marriage and allow use of its divorce
mechanism, or will State Yrefuse to recognize the civil union as marriage,
thereby sending the couple back to Vermont to dissolve the civil union?
Full faith and credit may, in the above situations, require one state to
recognize the Vermont civil union. A person civilly united in Vermont may
be disabled from entering into a marriage or domestic partnership in a sister
state. It seems a far stretch of the imagination to anticipate that the other
states will open their divorce courts to a same-sex couple that has
participated in a ceremony in Vermont that has not resulted in a marriage,
although both are now prevented (at least in Vermont) from marrying
someone else until there is a dissolution.
It is now time to return to our two hypotheticals."47 In the first, Will and
Jack are registered pursuant to New York City's domestic partnership
ordinance. They celebrate a Vermont civil union, return to Manhattan, and
Jack gets dumped for someone else. It appears thatNew York City is under
no obligation to prevent Will from registering his new domestic partner in
lieu of Jack. The language of the Civil Union Law only prevents Jack from
entering into a marriage or civil union. It says nothing about domestic
partnerships. Full faith and credit does not flow from a marriage or civil
union disability in Vermont to a domestic partnership in New York City.
11 Similar, abbreviated situations are discussed in Brian H. Bix, State of the
Union: The States' Interest in the Marital Status of Their Citizens, 55 U. MIAM L.
REv. 1, 25-26 (2000).
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On the other hand, New York could recognize the civil union as a
higher form of domestic partnership. New York could accept the doctrine
of lex loci; that is, New York could determine that the law of Vermont
considers Will disqualified from marrying or entering into any legal entity
where a right or benefit similar to marriage is granted and thus New York
cannot either. A person in a legal marriage may not register anyone else for
benefits granted only to a spouse; New York could accept the restrictions
of the civil union and bar Will from granting domestic partner benefits to
anyone other than Jack until the civil union is dissolved. It is even possible
that New York could say that the domestic partnership could no longer be
terminated unilaterally because the transformation to a civil union requires
a dissolution. It is unlikely, however, that New York State would allow
Will and Jack to seek a dissolution pursuantto its Domestic Relations Law;
its specific sections authorize only divorce or annulment of marriages. This
leaves Will in a quandary: stuck in the legal entity of civil union, yet not a
resident of Vermont to invoke its dissolution procedures. Jack, of course,
is sitting pretty.
The second hypothetical considers Vermont not only the lex loci of the
civil union but the partners' domicile as well. Will and Jack then move to
State X where Will meets and marries Grace. Jack sues to declare the
marriage void. Here State Xmay decline to recognize the civil union as a
marriage and, therefore, Will cannot be disabled from marrying Grace
because he is not otherwise married. Under this analysis, State Xdoes not
reach the issue of the Civil Union Law's disability because StateXdeclines
to equate a civil union with a marriage. Full faith and credit is not
technically necessary because StateXrules that the two relationship entities
are not similar-a civil union is a creature unique to Vermont; its marital
disability is limited to Vermont.
On the other hand, State X could accept the Civil Union Law's
definition of the ramifications of civil union: one partner at a time. If Jack
is a legal partner, Grace may not become a spouse until the civil union with
Jack is dissolved. By recognizing Will's disability, full faith and credit is
thereby granted to the civil union. StateXneed not extend its own benefits
and privileges of marriage to the civil union, but it may prevent Will from
marrying Grace until the civil union is dissolved. Jack, again, is sitting
pretty.
The same principles may apply to the federal government. It appears
unlikely, pursuant to the Defense of Marriage Act, that the federal
government will extend spousal benefits and privileges to a civil union
partner. Nevertheless, because the federal government must accept the
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validity of a marriage pursuant to the law of the state of celebration, it may
be required to grant full faith and credit to the Civil Union Law's disability
provision and therefore deny those same benefits to the "spouse" of a
subsequent "marriage." One could argue that the very limiting language of
DOMA, even assuming its constitutionality, limits its outlook to same-sex
"marriages." The civil union is not a marriage; therefore DOMA does not
apply. Further, the United States, no less than the states themselves, may
be required to grant full faith and credit to Vermont's legislative statement
of marital disability. A civil union partner may thereafter marry a person of
the opposite gender, but the "spouse" may not be considered as such under
federal law. Therefore, such benefits and privileges as joint income tax
filings, spousal military benefits, etc., would be inaccessible.
CONCLUSION
Vermont's Civil Union Law seems to provide every bit as much of a
marital disability as any marriage contracted in any state. A partner to a
civil union may not marry in Vermont because he or she is in a quasi-
marriage. (One might even call the civil union a de facto marriage.) If Will
Truman travels from Vermont to New York and tries to engage in a second
domestic partnership with Joe, or if he tries to marry Grace without first
dissolving his Vermont civil union, his new domestic partnership marriage
should be null and void because he does not have the legal ability to
contract into another marital or quasi-marital relationship. It further appears
that a second jurisdiction must, under many circumstances, acknowledge
and accept the Vermont Civil Union statute under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.
While not accepting the idea of a legal same-sex marriage per se, once
specifically recognized by any state, a sister state may still be required to
grant full faith and creditto the declaration of marital status as determined
by Vermont. This will have the practical effect ofpreventing someone from
entering into other legal, marital or quasi-marital relationships while still
a partner in a Vermont civil union. Sister states and the federal government,
therefore, will be giving indirect sanction to the same-sex relationship and
are required to do so under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
Marriage in the twenty-first century is likely to undergo many
changes."' Civil unions are just the first of a new breed of legally
14 See Harry D. Krause, Marriage for the New Millennium: Heterosexual,
Same Sex--or Not at All?, 34 FAM. L.Q. 271,292-300 (2000).
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sanctioned relationships beyond the specific confines of marriage. Whether
granted to homosexual couples or heterosexual couples, these new entities
sanction and recognize a reality that already permeates our contemporary
society; non-marital relationships already exist and some legal sanction has
already been granted to them." As new forms of legal relationships sprout
from creative legislatures and courts, other states will be required, under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, to accept them and their legal ramifica-
tions.
Civil unions are just the first wave of these new quasi-marriages. To
deny full faith and credit to the Vermont Civil Union Law because of
opposition to same-sex marriage would portend poorly for society in the
new millennium.
149 See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
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